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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 
'-. PI a:i n t I ff-Respondnnt, 14 58 5 
~vs-
HARRY MAESTAS, : 
Defendant-Appel ] ant. '• -'•"'-.' 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the Third Distiicr 
C - v j j •'• . • . • •! r , \ , ; •: . : ::-.v • - "• t 
assault by a [prisoner, a felony of the third degree 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
''• Appellant was tried on a two count i nformation' 
alleging that he committed the crimes of aggravated sexual 
a-0,-^1. .... ;SC;^,M1 I. v-v a prisoner. Appellant was convicted 
fc ]u,) oi assault, ;\>v a prisoner and was acquitted of 
aggravated sexual assault. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks that the jury verdict, 
and sentence imposed pursuant thereto, be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the trial, Michael William Hart, convicted 
of first degree arson and second degree murder, testified 
that on January 15, 1976, he was a prisoner at the Utah 
State Prison, incarcerated in "Cff section of the maximum 
security facility. He further testified as follows: Upon 
leaving his job in the prison kitchen around 5:00 p.m. 
on January 15, 197 6, he returned to his cell, stopping 
off at the lieutenant's office to pick up come commissary 
order forms (T. 14). Upon reaching his cell area, he 
proceeded to his individual cell, walked back out and gave 
some commissary forms to the defendant Harry Maestas, who 
was sitting on a table watching T.V. with another cellmate, 
Edward Cornish. He then proceeded to give some of the 
slips to Cornish, place some on another cellmate's bed 
(Myron Lance), then return to his cell and place the 
remainder on his desk. (T. 17). Hart then walked out of 
his cell, heading towards the table the T.V. was on, 
looking for a bucket to use for washing (T. 17). As 
Hart turned around to ask Maestas or Cornish if either 
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knew where the bucket was, he (Hart) was hit by Maestas* 
Hart was then pushed into his cell by Maestas and Cornish, 
where they struck him several more times, telling Hart 
that they were tired of being harassed by him about the 
commissary (T. 18-19). Conversation then occurred 
between Hart and Maestas (T. 19-20). Hart was then beaten 
again by Maestas (T. 20). 
Other medical testimony confirmed that Hart 
had received lacerations and bruises (T. 92,99). 
Testimony by Sergeant Ken Miles of the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office revealed a statement made 
to him by the appellant Maestas to the effect that he 
(Maestas) "nailed" Hart because Hart was "driving" 
on him about money ow^d to Hart by Maestas (T. 126-128). 
Appellant Maestas admits striking Hart four or 
five times because he claimed he heard Cornish yell "Watch 
out", and because Hart allegedly "came on" Maestas real 
fast (T. 218-219). On cross-examination, Maestas 
admitted hitting Hart because he (Hart) was "driving" 
on Maestas about the commissary (T. 244). 
Cornish's testimony followed pretty much the 
same outline as that of Maestas, although Cornish claims 
he did not see the blows themselves, only the results 
therefrom (T. 195). 
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It seems apparent that the jury believed that 
portion of Hart's testimony relating the incident, at 
least beyond a reasonable doubt, since a guilty verdict 
of assault by a prisoner was returned (T. 321). 
Appellant Maestas, who testified in this case, 
has been convicted of second degree murder, manslaughter, 
armed robbery and burglary (T. 214). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE 
COUNSEL TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS HART CONCERNING 
AGREEMENTS WITH THE STATE IN RETURN FOR HIS TESTIMONY 
DID NOT DENY APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Appellant contends that the trial judge refused 
to allow defense counsel to bring out the nature of the 
State's agreement with the victim (William Hart) in return 
for his testimony, and this refusal was prejudicial to 
appellant. A thorough reading of the transcript reveals 
no evidence whatsoever of any agreement between Hart and 
the State of Utah regarding favors for Hart in return for 
his testimony. Thus it would seem that appellant is being 
rather presumptuous in assuming that any agreement 
existed, when in fact there is no evidence to indicate 
any agreement whatsoever. 
-4-
Appellant cites several cases which reinforce 
the axiomatic principle that cross-examination of 
witnesses is fundamental to preserve the constitutional 
right of confrontation of witnesses. Respondent does 
not take issue with appellant as to this constitutionally 
protected right, nor is issue taken in regards to the 
use of cross examination to expose possible motives of 
a witness for testifying. This was expressed by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Smelser, 23 Utah 2d 347 
463 P.2d 562 (1970) where the court quoted from respondent's 
brief in a footnote: 
"Cross examination is a matter 
of right. . . it . . . may be designed 
to expose the motives of the witness 
for testifying as he did on direct 
examination; and that such exposure 
properly goes to the credibility of 
. . . [his] . . . direct testimony. 
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 
687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 
(1931)." 
It seems, however, that appellant has not 
grasped the concept that cross-examination is not a 
"fishing expedition", nor is it unlimited, lying at the 
whimsical disposal of either defense counsel or the 
prosecutor, to be used when and in whatever manner either 
may see fit. The extent of cross-examination is a matter 
which lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, 
State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972), 
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and this exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be 
interfered with by the Supreme Court unless there is an 
abuse of discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. 
State v, Belwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519 (1972); 
State v. Robinson, 24 Wash. 2d 909, 167 P.2d 986 (1946). 
Cross examination on motives or bias of witnesses 
may be curtailed, without necessarily being prejudicial. 
People v. Currey, 97 Cal. App.2d 537, 218 P.2d 153 
(1950) . American Jurisprudence gives an excellent summary 
as to when and for what reasons cross examination as to 
motives for testifying may be restricted in 81 Am. Jur. 
2d § 560, pp. 561, 563-564: 
"In criminal cases, it is widely 
recognized that counsel for the accused 
has the right to cross-examine witnesses 
for the prosecution for the purpose of 
showing their motives in testifying 
and that considerable latitude in such 
respect should be allowed. 
On the other hand, it lies 
within the sound discretion of the 
trial court to determine the propriety 
of such cross-examination, and abuse 
of that discretion must be shown in 
order to constitute prejudicial error. 
The denial or restriction of cross-
examination as to the motive of a 
witness for the prosecution has been 
held proper, or at least not pre-
judically erroneous, when the questions 
asked were repetitious; when the cross-
examination sought to bring out specula-
tive matter; where the matter sought to 
be elicited had been brought out in 
evidence previously or subsequently 
adduced.,f 
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In the case at hand, review of the transcript 
(T. 60-61) reveals that the questions asked by appellant's 
counsel on cross-examination of William Hart as to whether 
or not he had negotiated with the State in return for 
his testimony were repetitious, speculative, and had 
already been answered on cross-examination by Hart. 
When being questioned by appellant's counsel on cross-
examination , the following colloquy between Hart and 
Mr. Keller (appellant's counsel) took place: 
"Mr. Keller: Isn't it true that you 
made up this story so you could get 
out of the maximum security unit of 
the Utah State Prison? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir. 
Mr. Keller: You have never told anyone 
that you wanted to get out of maximum 
security unit? 
Mr. Hart: Sir, I have said I wanted to 
get out. 
Mr. Keller: And you would do it any way 
you could? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir. (T. 33)." 
Further cross-examination of Hart by appellant's 
counsel resulted in the following colloquy: 
Mr. Keller: I see, you testified at the 
preliminary hearing in this matter that 
you knew, well before this incident 
on January 15th that you had better get 
out of maximum security didn't you? 
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Mr. Hart: No Sir, 
Mr. Keller: You didn't? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir. 
Mr. Keller: But you were concerned about 
staying in maximum security at Utah State 
Prison? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir, I was not. 
Mr. Keller: Because of other incidents 
you were involved in? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir. 
Mr. Keller: In fact you wanted out of 
there Mr. Hart? 
Mr. Hart: I would have liked to got out, 
yes. 
Mr. Keller: Yes? You are not afraid to 
admit that you wanted out of maximum 
security? 
Mr. Hart: Yes Sir. (T. 59)." 
Sergeant Ken Miles of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office was cross-examined by appellant's counsel 
in regards to an interview that Sergeant Miles had with 
the victim Michael Hart. The following colloquy ensued: 
"Mr. Keller: . . . . Well, after Mr. 
Hart talked with you did you indicate 
to him that you would take any steps 
to see that there were no repercussions 
from him making these allegations? 
Sergeant Miles: I told him that the 
only choice I had was to present the 
case to the county attorney and in the 
event there is a criminal complaint issued 
then it is between the sheriff and the 
warden of the prison to make arrangements 
for his care. 
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Mr. Keller: He did demand of you 
certain conditions before he made 
a statement didn't he? Did he 
detective Miles? 
Sergeant Miles: I would say no. 
Mr. Keller: Didn't he tell you he 
wanted out of the Utah State Prison, 
he wanted to be transferred to an-
other prison? 
Sergeant Miles: No. (T. 140-141)." 
Appellant alleges in his brief that there 
apparently was an agreement between the State and Mr. Hart 
that if Mr. Hart testified for the State, he would not 
be sent back to Utah State Prison, but would remain 
incarcerated in one of the local jails. The above colloquies 
most definitely negate the allegations of appellant as 
to the existence of any such agreement. Appellant's 
counsel, however, not receiving the answer he was seeking, 
continued to "fish" for answers which would substantiate 
his allegations and further his client's cause. The 
following colloquy is the subject of this particular 
point of the appeal: 
"Mr. Keller: And as a result of your 
testimony in this case the State has 
agreed to not send you back to the 
Utah State Prison, haven't they? 
Mr. Stott: I'm going to object. 
Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Keller: Your Honor. 
Court: Objection is sustained. 
-9-
Mr. Keller: I would like to argue 
that point, Your Honor, may we do so 
outside the presence of the jury? 
Court: Ask your next question. 
Mr. Keller: May we at least approach 
the bench on it? 
Court: Ask your next question counsel, 
please. 
Mr. Keller: What other agreement did 
you make with the State of Utah for 
your testimony, Mr. - - -
Mr. Stott: I'm going to object to 
that, there isn't any evidence, he is 
assuming things. 
Court: Objection is sustained. 
Mr. Keller: Your Honor, we are 
entitled to know what agreements have 
been made with this man in return for 
his testimony against the defendants. 
There is a long line of case law that 
allows us to do that. 
Court: Ask your next question counsel. 
(T. 60-61)." 
Certainly the objection to Mr. Keller's 
question was sustained on the grounds of repetition. 
Mr. Hart had already answered this question in the 
negative. Perhaps counsel for appellant continued to 
ask this question due to his disbelief of Mr. Hart's 
answer. If so, the trial judge was correct in restricting 
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further cross-examination. In People v. Clay, 27 111. 2d 
87 187 N.E.2d 719 (1963), a witness for the prosecution 
stated she had not been paid to act as an informer, 
whereupon defense counsel stated "In other words, you 
do it for the good of the country, is that correct?" 
The objection to the question was sustained. The court 
said: 
"The question appears to be rehetorical 
and shows counsel's disbelief in the 
witnesses previous answer that she was 
not paid to be an informant." 
Sustaining of the objection was held not to be restricting 
of cross-examination* 
A similar situation existed in People v. Bliss, 
76 111. 2d 232, 222 N.E.2d 57 (1966). There a witness 
for the prosecution had disclosed that a charge against 
her for possession of narcotics had been dropped. Defense 
counsel continued on cross-examination to further inquire 
as to promises by police to dismiss such charges. The 
court sustained objections to further questions on cross-
examination as being repetitious and superfluous. This 
was held not to be improper limiting of cross-examination. 
There is a long line of cases upholding the 
aforementioned principle that limiting of cross-examination 
where the questions are repetitious will be sustained and 
will not be held to prejudice the defendant. State v. 
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White, 146 Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965); People v. 
Micelo, 101 Cal. App. 2d 643, 226 P.2d 14 (1951); People 
v. Warren, 175 Cal. App. 2d 233, 346 P.2d 64 (1959). 
Since there is no evidence that any agreement 
exists between Hart and the State, appellant's allegation 
is speculative at best. In State v. Knapp, 14 Wash. App. 
101, 540 P.2d 898 (1975), the court held that it is not 
error for the trial court to limit or reject cross-
examination where the circumstances only remotely tend 
to show bias or prejudice of the witness, where the 
evidence is vague, or where the evidence is merely 
argumentative and speculative. 
It should be pointed out that the nature of the 
question asked by Mr. Keller carried with it an implication 
that perhaps an agreement did exist between Hart and the 
State, and the jury would certainly have been aware of 
defense counsel's objections in asking the question. 
Such was the case in State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643, 185 
S.E.2d 227 (1971). An objection to a question whether 
or not an accomplice's attorney told him he would get 
help on his parole in return for his testimony was 
sustained. No abuse of discretion was found. The 
court said there was no showing that the verdict was 
influenced, and that the question itself carried full 
implication to the jury of any contention suggested. 
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Finally, the question should perhaps be asked 
"Would the answering of further questions by Mr. Hart 
have further aided the jury when he had already given 
his answers?" If not, then restricting or curtailment 
of cross-examination is not error. People v. French, 
75 111. 2d 453, 220 N.E.2d 635 (1966). In the case at 
hand, it seems doubtful that allowing Hart to answer 
further questions from appellant's counsel on cross-
examination would have further aided the jury in deter-
mining credibility or weight to be given to Hart's 
testimony. 
The latest Utah case on the subject of 
restricting cross-examination when attempting to 
show bias is State v. Smelser, infra. There the 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the trial court's 
refusal to permit cross-examination of a prosecution 
witness to raise an implication that the witness, 
who was in jail with the defendant, was testifying in 
order to gain favors such as a quicker release from 
jail, may have been error, but if so, was not prejudicial 
to the defendant. It should be noted that the court 
in Smelser did not, as appellant says, declare the 
trial court committed error in refusing to permit 
cross-examination of the witness, but merely declared 
that error may have been committed. Even so, it was 
not prejudicial. 
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In conclusion, several points should be noted. 
First, any possible arrangement between Hart and the State 
in return for his testimony was denied by Hart when he 
said his motive for testifying was not for the purpose 
of gaining release from maximum security or the Utah 
State Prison. Hart was not fabricating a story con-
cerning his beating, since there was corroborating 
evidence that Hart had been beaten. Second, there is 
not evidence of any agreement between Hart and the State 
other than appellantfs counsel's allegations and specu-
lations. Third, the jury was apprised of any implications 
or suspicions when Hart answered the "accusing" questions 
the first and second times they were asked, and even 
the third time when the objection to the question was 
sustained. 
It would seem that the trial judge's decision 
to sustain the objection was based on repetition or 
speculation. No abuse of discretion to the prejudice 
of appellant can be found. The trial court's decision 
should be left to stand. There is no showing that the 
jury's verdict would have been or could have been different. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
WITH REGARD TO SELF-DEFENSE DID NOT DENY APPELLANT HIS 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
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Appellant submitted a self-defense instruction 
(R. 74 1/2) which was refused by the trial court for 
the reason that there was no substantive evidence to 
warrant giving of the instruction• A review of the 
evidence contained in the transcript will reveal that 
the trial judge was correct in his ruling. 
A. The Evidence. 
On cross-examination the victim William Hart 
was asked whether or not it was true that the reason 
Harry Maestas hit him was because he (Hart) came up 
behind Maestas1 back and jabbed his finger into his 
back. Hart answered no, that this was not the reason 
(T. 32-33). Further cross-examination reveals the 
sequence of events as described by Hart: 
"Mr. Keller: Okay, when you walked 
out of your cell with the commissary 
slips you walked directly over to where 
Mr. Maestas was sitting? 
Mr. Hart: Yes Sir. 
Mr. Keller: And at that time you came 
up directly behind his back, did you 
not? 
Mr. Hart: No, I came to his side. 
Mr. Keller: His side? 
Mr. Hart: Yes Sir. 
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Mr. Keller: And with your finger you 
punched him in the shoulder like that, 
didn't you? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir. 
Mr. Keller: You didn't? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir. 
Mr. Keller: You deny that? 
Mr. Hart: Yes Sir. 
Mr. Keller: Okay, it was at that point 
that Harry twirled and hit you in the face 
right? 
Mr. Hart: No Sir. 
Mr. Keller: What happened then? 
Mr. Hart: After I gave the slips to Harry 
I walked over and gave some to Cornish and 
walked over and placed some on Myron Lance's 
bunk and returned to my cell with the 
remainder. 
Mr. Keller: And what did you do? 
Mr. Hart: Then I walked out to find the 
wash bucket which had been underneath the 
table prior to that. 
Mr. Keller: I see, did you ask Harry where 
that wash bucket was? 
Mr. Hart: I was turning to do so at the 
time I was struck. 
Mr. Keller: Where was the wash bucket? 
Mr. Hart: I don't know, I didn't see it, 
Mr. Keller: You never saw it? What did 
you want the wash bucket for? 
Mr. Hart: To wash out an apron that I 
wore in the kitchen. 
Mr. Keller: To wash out an apron that you 
wore? Okay. And it is your testimony then 
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that it was at this point when you 
were over here in this bench area 
that Mr. Maestas hit you? 
Mr. Hart: I was over on the left hand 
side of the bench. 
Mr. Keller: Behind Mr. Maestas? 
Mr. Hart: No in front of him, towards - -
Mr. Keller: In front of him? 
Mr. Hart: Right, in that area, yes sir. 
Mr. Keller: And you turned to talk to him? 
Mr. Hart: Yes Sir. 
Mr. Keller: Your back was to him? 
Mr. Hart: My side, my back. 
Mr. Keller: And just for no reason, just 
out of the blue he just hauled off and hit 
you? 
Mr. Hart: Yes. 
Mr. Keller: That is your testimony? 
Mr. Hart: Yes Sir." (T. 40-42). 
Other testimony by Hart disclosed that he had no idea 
why Maestas hit him (T. 44), nor did he recall Maestas 
making a statement to the effect "Look, don't come up 
on my back like that. I'm sorry I hit you." (T. 56). 
A very important piece of evidence is the testimony 
that Maestas owed Hart money (T. 37). 
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Testimony by third parties refute any theory 
of self defense. Dr. Austin testified that he observed 
abrasions, several bruises, and lacerations on Hart, 
which would very strongly indicate that several punches 
were thrown on Hart (T. 99), as would the swollen hands 
of Maestas. (T. 108) . 
Sergeant William Johnstun testified that Harry 
Maestas told him that he had hit Hart because Hart had 
made some smart remark to him, and he (Maestas) had lost 
his temper and hit him. (T. 109). 
Sergeant Ken Miles took a statement from 
Harry Maestas, and related the contents of that statement 
during the trial. During the statement Maestas told 
Sergeant Miles that he (Maestas) had hit Hart because 
Hart "was driving on him" about money owed to Hart by 
Maestas (T. 126-128). Maestas never made any mention to 
Sergeant Miles about Hart poking him (Maestas) with his 
finger before being struck. Maestas also admitted that 
he owed Hart money, and that he had struck Hart four or 
fives more times after the initial blow (T. 127). 
Testimony by appellant's witnesses did not 
aid his theory of self-defense. Edward Cornish testified 
that he did not see Maestas hit Hart (T. 205), when just 
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prior to that statement he testified he saw Hart get 
hit by Harry (T. 204-205). At best, we have appellant's 
witness contradicting himself. Appellantfs other witness, 
Myron Lance, testified that he really didn't know 
what went on or what occurred (T. 191). 
Finally, we have appellant's testimony. We 
have already seen where appellant has told Sergeant 
Johnstun that he hit Hart because he (Maestas) had lost 
his temper over a smart remark allegedly made by Hart, 
while telling Sergeant Miles that he (Maestas) nailed 
Hart because he (Hart) was driving on him about some 
money owed to Hart by Maestas. It should be noted that 
this subject of money had been discussed by Maestas 
and Cornish prior to Maestas beating up Hart (T. 127-128). 
Appellant also testified that he hit Hart because he 
(Hart) had sneaked up to him (T. 220), and yet he tries 
to justify why he told Sergeant Johnstun and Sergeant 
Miles a different reason for the beating while being 
cross-examined (T. 228). 
At best, what we have is a defendant with 
multiple felony convictions giving different people 
different versions and reasons as to why he beat up 
Hart. One reason is because Maestas owed Hart money. 
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Another is because Hart made a smart remark and Maestas 
lost his temper. Another is because Hart allegedly 
"poked" his finger on Maestas1 chest, while yet another is 
because Hart "slapped" Maestas* arm with some commissary 
slips. Finally, we have Maestas saying that he had no 
reason to believe that Hart was going to hurt him, 
other than Maestas1 belief that Hart was coming up on 
him too fast (T. 236). Maestas1 reply to the question 
as to why he kept hitting Hart time after time when he 
could have stopped after the first couple of hits and 
asked why he (Hart) came up on him so fast was that he 
(Maestas) wanted to make sure he (Hart) couldn't hurt 
him (T. 236)-
There was no evidence of self-defense for 
the jury to consider. What we have is an attempt 
by appellant's counsel to "inject" words into the 
witnesses1 mouths which would give credence to his 
theory of "self-defense". 
B. The Law. 
Certainly the defendant in any criminal case 
is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted 
to the jury by appropriate instructions iif such a theory 
is supported by competent and substantial evidence. 
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This has been the law in Utah for many years and remains 
so at the present time, having been reaffirmed by the 
Utah Supreme Court many times. State v. Newton, 105 Utah 
561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943); State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 
130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 
70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969); State v. Gillam, 23 Utah 2d 372, 
463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145, 
The question then to be answered is whether 
or not there exists in the case at hand substantial 
evidence with which to support appellant's claim of 
self-defense. A look at the Castillo case answers 
that question in the negative. In Castillo, the 
defendant barged into his former wife's house 
armed with a knife, anticipating trouble. His sole basis 
for apprehension was his observation of a stick under 
the couch on a previous occasion. There was there, 
as here, several versions of what happened. The 
prosecution's version claimed that defendant was 
met at the door by his ex-wife's brother, who defendant 
claimed had a stick. Defendant's ex-wife was then summoned 
by her brother to hurry and phone a cab, at which time 
defendant came at the brother with a knife. The ex-
wife interceded and grabbed the knife. Defendant then 
wrenched the knife away and stabbed her. She ran, and 
as she left she observed the defendant advancing towards 
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her brother with the knife. She heard the sound of 
a stick breaking, then a struggle between her brother 
and the defendant ensued with her brother being 
stabbed. The defendant's version claimed that the 
brother hit him (defendant) from behind with a stick, 
knocking the defendant to the floor. The defendant 
then came at the brother with a knife. There is then 
no further recollection of what happened by the 
defendant. 
In refusing defendant's request for a self-
defense instruction, holding that there was not sub-
stantial evidence to support such a theory, the court 
said: 
"In State v. Johnson, the court 
observed that in those cases where 
a request for instructions on 
defendant's theory was sustained, 
defendant's evidence established 
a state of facts which, if believed 
by the jury, established adequate 
provocation, lawful acts on the part 
of the defendant, or ether aggravating 
facts. 
If the defendant's evidence, although 
in material conflict with the State's 
prooff be such that the jury may 
entertain a reasonable doubt as to 
whether or not he acted in self-
defense, he is entitled to have the 
jury instructed fully and clearly 
on the law of self-defense. Conversely, 
if all reasonable men must conclude that 
the evidence is so slight as to be 
incapable of raising at reasonable doubt 
in the jury's mind as to whether a 
defendant accused of a crime acted in 
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self-defense, tendered instructions 
thereon are properly refused." 
No evidence in the case at hand can be found which 
would raise a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as 
to whether or not Maestas acted in self-defense. In 
fact, no evidence can be found to indicate that any 
unlawful force, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-2-4 02, 
(1953), as amended, was used against Maestas at all. 
Did Maestas reasonably believe that unlawful force 
was about to be used against him? Certainly the 
evidence does not indicate so. 
As was so well put by the court in Castillo, 
in quoting from State v. Talavico, 57 Utah 229, 234, 
193 P. 860, 861 (1920), what we have in the case at 
hand is the following situation: 
"While the theory of counsel, 
persistently and strenuously urged, 
was that of self-defense, it was 
nevertheless all theory and no 
evidence, all shadow and no sub-
stance. " 
We have at the very worst, if defendant's 
final version is believed, a case of Kart touching 
Maestas on the arm with commissary slips, subsequently 
being stricken severely four of five times for "coming 
up on him (Maestas) too fast." What we really have, 
however, is a case of Maestas owing Hart some money, 
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Hart asking when he can expect payment, and Hart sub-
sequently being severely beaten up for no apparent reason 
other than he was "driving on" Maestas and his nerves. 
This is admitted by appellant himself in one of his 
versions of his ever-changing story. 
It is clear that the trial judge could not see 
any evidence, substantive or not, of unlawful force which 
was used against the appellant. An instruction on self-
defense would therefore have been improper. This the 
trial judge decided as a matter of law, and rightly so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons heretofore mentioned, respondent 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the conviction 
and subsequent sentence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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